Data the and tampering are serious concerns as a ackers have aggressively begun to exploit weaknesses in current memory systems to advance their nefarious schemes. e storage industry is moving toward emerging non-volatile memories (NVM), including the spin-transfer torque magnetoresistive random access memory (STT-MRAM) and the phase change memory (PCM), owing to their high density and low power operation. e advent of novel memory technologies has led to new vulnerabilities including data sensitivity to magnetic eld and temperature uctuations and data persistence a er power down. In this paper, we propose SMART: a Secure Magnetoelectric Antiferromagnet-Based Tamper-Proof memory, which leverages unique properties of antiferromagnetic materials and offers dense, on-chip non-volatile storage. SMART memory is not only resilient against data con dentiality a acks seeking to leak sensitive information but also protects data integrity and prevents Denial of Service (DoS) a acks on the memory. It is impervious to power side-channel a acks, which exploit asymmetric reads/writes for '0' and '1' logic levels, and photonic side-channel a acks, which monitor photo-emission signatures from the chip backside. Further, the ultra-low power magnetoelectric switching coupled with the terahertz regime antiferromagnetic dynamics result in ∼ 4 orders lower energy-per-bit and ∼ 3 orders smaller latency for the SMART memory as compared to prior NVMs such as STT-MRAM and PCM.
INTRODUCTION
Conventional DRAM scaling has reached a critical tipping point as the miniaturization of the DRAM cell has plateaued in recent years. Feature size scaling beyond the 20 nm technology node is met with numerous challenges such as smaller retention times, higher leakage currents, and increased fault rates [1] . Solutions to address these concerns include improved DRAM fault detection and recovery [2] , as well as architectural techniques to enhance DRAM scaling [3] .
A promising solution to the memory scaling problem is to realize the main memory system using non-volatile technologies [4] . Examples of emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) include spintransfer torque magnetoresistive random access memory (STT-MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FeRAM), resistive random access memory (ReRAM), and phase change memory (PCM). Recent interest in NVMs from memory manufacturers has escalated signi cantly. For instance, Intel's current line of 3D XPoint memory systems utilize PCM-based NVM technology [5] . IBM and Everspin's new solid state drive comes with STT-MRAM write caches [6] . While NVMs o er a ractive features, such as high density, low leakage, and non-volatile data retention, they also su er from poor endurance and high access latency in their current implementation.
Memory security has come under a lot of scrutiny recently. is is because a acks such as Spectre [7] and Meltdown [8] targeting side-channels associated with speculative execution and out-oforder execution, respectively, exposed security vulnerabilities in a wide array of currently deployed processors and memory architectures. In the case of NVMs, data persistence a er power down presents a severe threat to data con dentiality as malicious a ackers aiming to steal private data can do so easily by mounting cold-boot a acks [9] or other removal a acks like stealing the memory DIMM [10] . Moreover, magnetic memories like STT-MRAM are highly sensitive to stray magnetic elds. As such, magnetic eld-based a acks [11] can be used to corrupt the stored data or compromise the memory's functional integrity, causing a Denial of Service (DoS). Hence, such security vulnerabilities pose a crucial impediment to pervasive large-scale proliferation of NVMs in the memory industry.
In this paper, we present an alternative to conventional NVMs such as STT-MRAM and PCM, in the form of SMART: a Secure Magnetoelectric Antiferromagnet-Based Tamper-Proof memory. SMART memory leverages the room-temperature linear magnetoelectric (ME) e ect in antiferromagnets (AFMs) like chromia [12] , which can be switched solely using voltage pulses without the use of electric currents, leading to ultra-low energy (∼aJ) operation. Further, the intrinsic dynamics of AFMs is typically in the terahertz regime (∼ 10 12 Hz), which is ∼ 3 orders of magnitude faster than the delay of other NVMs including STT-MRAM and PCM. In addition to its energy and latency improvements, the SMART memory o ers a signi cant advancement in terms of secure tamper-proof data storage. For example, AFMs do not exhibit a magnetic signature since they do not have a net external magnetic moment, unlike ferromagnets (FM). Hence, the SMART memory cannot be probed or switched with external magnetic elds, unlike the way STTMRAMs can. is, in turn, eliminates the possibility of magnetic eld a acks targeting data integrity or aiming to induce a DoS. To address the post-shutdown data persistence of SMART memory, we demonstrate an in-memory encryption scheme employing ME-AFM transistor-based controlled NOT (CNOT) logic. We discuss the resilience of the SMART memory against a acks aiming to undermine data con dentiality and data delity, in both powered on and powered down states. e main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
(1) We introduce SMART, a secure ME-AFM-based NVM and develop analytic models for its design and simulation. (2) We demonstrate the resilience of SMART memory against magnetic eld and temperature a acks, which can a ect other NVMs like the STT-MRAM. We explore the implications of various side channel a acks on the SMART memory. (3) We present an in-memory encryption scheme with ME-AFM transistor-based CNOT gates, to protect the data stored in SMART memory against cold-boot and stolen DIMM a acks.
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Prior works on securing NVMs have focused mainly on memory encryption schemes, which are necessary to prevent a ackers from exploiting data persistence in o -state. Chhabra et al. proposed an incremental encryption scheme [13] for NVMs where only inert memory pages, which have not been accessed for a while, are encrypted selectively. e working set of the memory (which is in current use) is in plaintext and, hence, incurs no encryption overhead on access. Such a selective encryption ensures that the majority of the main memory content (but not all) remains encrypted at all times, without overly compromising the performance. However, it requires dedicated hardware, inert page prediction, and scheduling for its implementation. A sneak path encryption scheme was demonstrated for memristor-based NVMs in [14] , wherein sneak paths in the memristor crossbar array are exploited to apply encryption pulses to change the resistances of the memory cells, and hence, encrypt the stored data.
In [10] , the authors proposed DEUCE, a dual counter encryption for PCM memories, which signi cantly reduces the number of modi ed bits per writeback, to improve performance and lifetime of the memory.
is scheme aims to mitigate the impact of the avalanche e ect [15] occurring during memory encryption, by reencrypting and writing back only the modi ed words during any write operation. Swami et al. took this concept forward and proposed SECRET [16] , a smart encryption scheme for NVMs, which integrates word-level re-encryption and zero-based partial writes to reduce memory write operations. ey also demonstrate write optimization through the use of energy masks in the encryption XOR logic, which minimizes the bit ips in the encryption process thereby reducing the total write energy. An advanced counter mode encryption (ACME) was presented in [17] , which utilizes the write leveling architecture inherent in PCM memories, to perform counter write leveling. ACME helps to avoid Rowhammer-type a acks by preventing the counter associated with any single cache line from over owing.
e impact of contactless tampering in STT-MRAMs using external magnetic elds was highlighted in [11] . e authors showed how magnetic eld-based a acks can corrupt the contents of STT-MRAM cells, through micromagnetic simulations of FMs in magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJs). ey also proposed duplicating the STT-MRAM array to implement an on-chip sensor for detecting such magnetic eld-based incursions, and error correction modules to compensate cell failures arising due to these a acks. eir implementation, however, incurs large energy and area penalties due to the additional hardware requirements imposed by the magnetic eld sensor and error correction scheme.
DEVICE MODEL AND FUNCTIONALITY
e linear ME e ect [18] represents the coupling between applied magnetic eld and induced polarization or between applied electric eld and induced magnetization in non-centrosymmetric crystals like chromia (Cr 2 O 3 ). Compared to the STT-based magnetization reversal of FMs requiring electric currents on the order of ∼ 10 6 A/cm 2 and associated Joule heating, the ME e ect provides an energy-e cient all-electrical switching of the roughnessinsensitive boundary magnetization of chromia [19] . Additionally, chromia is an AFM; hence, the net bulk magnetic moment (difference of the subla ice magnetization vectors) vanishes and is imperceptible externally. However, the boundary magnetization is strongly coupled to the AFM order parameter. at is, the electrical switching of the AFM order results in reversal of the boundary magnetization [20] , which is used to encode the information in ME-AFM memories.
e uncompensated surface moments at the (0001) surface of chromia result in an equilibrium boundary magnetization, which could be in one of the two oppositely aligned domain states. e degeneracy between the domains is li ed through ME annealing, which allows the preferential selection of one of the states [21] .
is e ect then polarizes the surface and results in a single domain surface moment. Isothermal switching between these single domain states using an electric eld E and a small symmetry-breaking dc magnetic eld H has been demonstrated [21] . e critical condition for this ME switching is that the E · H product must exceed the ME threshold energy barrier, which is as low as ≈ 1 J/m 3 . e chromia-based ME-AFMRAM, which is at the heart of our SMART memory, is shown in Fig. 1 . Experimentally demonstrated by Kosub et al. [22] , the ME-AFMRAM employs a bo om gate electrode for applying the gate voltage, which provides the electric eld necessary for writing data into the memory. e small symmetrybreaking magnetic eld (≈ 30 mT) is provided by the stray eld of a permanent magnet. A positive gate voltage may orient the bulk order and, hence, put the surface magnetization in one domain (with surface moments pointing up), whereas a negative gate voltage will result in the surface magnetization relaxing to the opposite domain (with surface moments pointing down). ese two states correspond to logic '1' and '0', respectively. e read-out is achieved through an anomalous Hall (AH) bar electrode setup, which discerns the boundary magnetization of chromia by sensing the proximity e ect-induced magnetization in the nearby Platinum (Pt) electrode, thereby producing a proportional Hall voltage [23] . Traditionally, the order parameter of AFMs is read-out via an exchange bias arrangement [24] in another FM a ached adjacently to the AFM surface. However, the exchange bias and the FM's hysteresis increase the coercive voltage required to overcome the ME barrier and, hence, impact the write energy negatively. To avoid this e ect, Kosub et al. [22] proposed the use of an exclusively ME-AFM setup with an AH read-out of the surface magnetization, thereby eliminating the need for an FM.
Although chromia is not a typical ferroelectric (FE), it exhibits a spontaneous surface polarization, in conjunction with uncompensated surface magnetic moments. Under the in uence of an applied electric eld, as the bulk order and surface magnetization undergo reversals, the surface polarization also switches [25] . Hence, FE hysteresis models of chromia, describing its polarization reversal characteristics, can be used to model the switching dynamics of the chromia-based ME-AFMRAM. Here, we combine the LandauKhalatnikov (LK) model of FE hysteresis [26] , which is a macroscopic model representing homogeneous FE switching, with the microscopic Weiss molecular model [27] that describes FE switching in terms of individual dipole reversals. Our model can thus capture the essence of the dynamical evolution of the chromia polarization, reconciled with its microscopic aspects.
e LK dynamical equation of motion for the total electric eld inside the chromia dielectric is given as
where U is the entropy per unit volume and ρ(dP/dt) represents the Ohmic losses in the dielectric (P represents the surface polarization). Combining Eq. (1) with the Weiss model, we obtain the temporal evolution of the polarization order
where p is the average dipole moment, E a is the applied eld, τ 0 and W 0 are the Arrhenius pre-exponential factor and activation energy, respectively, α is the dipole coupling constant, and n is the total dipole density. Rearranging the terms in Eq. (2), we obtain,
C . Here, V (t) represents the instantaneous polarization P(t), C = τ 0 exp W 0 kT , and I (t) is a voltage-dependent current source of the form f (P) = 2np sinh p kT (E a + αP(t)) − P(t) cosh p kT (E a + αP(t)) . e bit line (BL) writes data on to the cell by switching the chromia FE polarization. Read-out is achieved through an AH setup, modeled with a voltage-controlled voltage source. C EL is the electrostatic capacitance of the chromia dielectric.
e RC circuit to model the FE response in chromia is implemented as a Verilog-A block and connected with peripheral read/write circuitry to construct the full ME-AFMRAM cell in Cadence Virtuoso using the 45-nm CMOS FreePDK technology. Figure 2 shows the equivalent circuit of the ME-AFMRAM cell. e write pulse, used to charge the chromia RC and switch the polarization P, is given through the bit line (BL) in the write setup. A er the write cycle, the read setup is enabled to read-out the stored polarization charge through an AH arrangement, modeled with a voltage-controlled voltage source (vcvs). Output voltage levels are then restored to logic '0'/'1' using an inverter chain. e AHE coe cient of Pt, used in the vcvs is taken as ∼ 5 pΩm [28] . e chromia layer considered is 60 × 60 × 10 nm 3 , with n = 1.85 × 10 28 /m 3 , p = 5 × 10 −30 Cm, and E a = 1 × 10 7 V/m [29, 30] . Hence, the write pulse magnitude is ∼ 100 mV. e electrostatic capacitance for chromia is calculated as 5.8 aF, considering a relative permi ivity of 11 for chromia [30] . Figure 3 shows the transient read/write operations of the ME-AFMRAM cell. e write and read latencies of the ME-AFMRAM cell are obtained as 8.5 ps and ∼10 ps, respectively, and the energy-perbit for one write-read operation cycle is 4.7 aJ. A comparison of the performance metrics of the ME-AFMRAM with other memory technologies is presented in Table 1 . It is seen that the ME-AFMRAM outperforms other NVMs as well as conventional memory systems in almost every aspect. on the chromia ME-AFMRAM cell. Note that for writing a '1' the write pulse is positive, and for writing a '0' the write pulse is negative. In this simulation, a series of '1's and '0's are being written to the cell, and then nally '1' is read o the cell. 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 4.1 reat model
Here, we discuss the threat model, which de nes the strengths and capabilities of an a acker as well as the objectives and consequences for a successful a ack. e a ack scenarios presented are considered for NVMs only.
• An a acker with physical access to a system can disassemble and remove the memory cells to try to read out the contents.
• e a acker can launch cold-boot a acks [9] . During power-down, there is some latency between the time when power-down sequence initiates and the instant when memory contents are completely secured. A ackers might use this time-window to read out memory contents. To circumvent such a acks, memory encryption is typically employed [13, 17] .
• A ackers could leverage properties like sensitivity to magnetic elds and temperature uctuations to corrupt the data or induce a DoS [11] . ey may forcibly write speci c data to memory, which accelerates aging and causes memory failures.
• With access to failure analysis equipment, an a acker can also resort to advanced invasive a acks. Majority of invasive a acks typically target the Back-End-of-Line (BEOL), approaching from the top-most metal layer, which is also referred to as a front-side a ack. However, a ackers can also enter through the substrate to conduct back-side attacks [33] [34] [35] . Here, by considering the possibility of a back-side a ack, we assume that an a acker would be interested in reading out the data stored in the memory.
• Asymmetricity in reading/writing logic '0' and '1' in the NVM, if any, can be exploited by the a acker to perform a side channel a ack to recover the stored information, through techniques like di erential power analysis (DPA) [36] and correlation power analysis (CPA) [37] .
Magnetic eld and temperature attacks
STT-MRAMs have FM-based MTJs as their basic building blocks. FMs possess a macroscopic magnetization or magnetic signature, which is visible externally and can be manipulated using magnetic elds. e fact that the MTJs in STT-MRAM respond to external elds is what makes them prime targets for any adversary a empting to tamper with the stored data or cause memory malfunction by leveraging magnetic eld-based a acks [11] . Stray elds from nearby magnets, as small as 0.01 T, could cause an unintended bit ip in the STT-MRAM cell, under close proximity. Fig. 4 shows the magnetic eld-induced bit ip in a representative FM, obtained by solving the Landau-Lifshitz-Gilbert equation for FM dynamics [38] .
AFMs, on the other hand, exhibit no external magnetic signature since their equal and opposite subla ice moments cancel each other out. Hence, the bulk order parameter cannot be a ected by external magnetic elds. To switch the bulk order, staggered elds (opposite sign on opposite subla ices) must be applied on both the subla ice moments, as illustrated in Fig. 5 inset. However, an external homogeneous magnetic eld is unable to provide such a staggered eld arrangement, and hence, just ends up canting the subla ice moments in a way wherein the torque due to the external eld is exactly balanced by the exchange torque exerted by one subla ice moment on the other [39] . As shown in elds are unable to reorient the AFM order parameter. 1 erefore, the SMART ME-AFMRAM is expected to be resistant to magnetic eld a acks described in [11] . With regards to temperature uctuation-based a acks, an adversary might try to increase the ambient temperature of the ME-AFMRAM in an a empt to alter the stored data. e Néel temperature of pure chromia is 308 K [40] , above which the AFM ordering is destroyed. Hence, the a acker may corrupt the memory by heating it above the Néel temperature. To counter this, we use Boron-doped chromia, whose Néel temperature is experimentally demonstrated to be ∼ 400 K [41] . Hence, Boron-doped chromia can increase the resilience of SMART memory against temperature uctuations. Figure 5 : Application of magnetic eld on AFM is unable to switch the order parameter, even on increasing the eld magnitude. Inset: (a) an external homogeneous magnetic eld cants the sublattice moments, but is insu cient to rotate the AFM order, (b) staggered elds on the sublattice moments produce staggered tangential torques, which can reorient the AFM order.
Data con dentiality attacks
As with all NVMs, data persistence in the SMART memory can be used by a ackers to steal sensitive information. e most e ective countermeasure against such data con dentiality a acks, including cold-boot and stolen DIMM a acks, is to encrypt the data in a secure encryption block, before storing it in the memory. Advanced memory encryption techniques like counter mode encryption (CME) use block ciphers, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), to encrypt a seed with a secret key, in order to generate a one-time pad (OTP). e seed for each write on a memory line consists of a secret key, the line address and a counter value associated with that line, which is incremented with each subsequent write to the same address. Hence, the generated OTP is unique for each line address, and also for each write to the same address. e OTP is then XORed with the plaintext to obtain the ciphertext, which is stored in the non-volatile main memory (NVMM). Directly applying XOR-based CME scheme to the SMART memory would result in large memory access overheads. is is because the CME scheme is tailored for NVMs like PCM and STT-MRAM, whose access time is on the order of ∼ns. However, the SMART memory is signi cantly faster with a read latency of ∼ 10 − 20 ps (see Sec. 3). Using CMOS XOR gates (with delays ∼ few 10's of ps) for encryption/decryption would result in a decryption time comparable to the memory access time, which will waste memory cycles and negatively impact the overall memory access latency.
Here, we will use in-memory encryption, or Memcryption, using bitwise CNOT gates constructed with ME-AFM-based logic devices. By tying the bits of an OTP or encryption pulse to the control bit of a CNOT gate, one can achieve controlled inversion of bits in the plaintext, depending on the encryption pulse. Spin devices like the ME-AFM transistor [42] are able to implement polymorphic logic gates, which can achieve inverting or non-inverting functionality based on a control signal [43] . Hence, the ME-AFM transistor can directly realize the CNOT gate. Further, the ME-AFM transistor is shown to have delays as small as ∼ 10 ps, which is substantially faster than CMOS XORs and compatible with the SMART memory access times.
e homogeneity in the technology and materials (ME-AFM) for the memory cells and CNOT gates will ensure ease of fabrication. In Memcryption, we embed ME-AFM transistor-based CNOT gates directly in the data path routed to the memory array; hence, the encryption is in-memory as opposed to prior works using a separate secure encryption block. is integration of encryption gates and memory array is not detrimental to the memory density since the ME-AFM transistors have a footprint that is ∼ 20× smaller than that of CMOS XORs (45 nm). Fig. 6 contrasts our Memcryption scheme with prior CME techniques. Figure 6 : (a) CME uses AES core to generate an OTP, using the memory line address, a counter and a secret key. e encryption/ decryption is performed outside the NVMM. (b) Memcryption uses a secret key and the line address as seed for a PRNG, to generate an encryption pulse. e encryption pulse is used to control the operation of bitwise CNOT gates embedded in the data path within the NVMM.
Encryption technique Decryption Latency Energy-per-bit CME [44] 8 cycles 6× Memcryption 1 cycle 2× e architecture of the SMART memory with Memcryption is shown in Fig. 7 . A trusted key from a secure processing module (SPM) is concatenated with the memory address and used a seed for a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). e PRNG produces an encryption pulse, whose bits are used as the control bits of the CNOT gates in the in-memory encryption layer. Depending on the control bits, the encryption layer selectively ips certain bits in the plaintext, before performing a memory write. During decryption, the same encryption pulse is generated again, and used to perform bitwise CNOT operations on the ciphertext (read from memory), to obtain the plaintext. 2 A comparison of the latency and energy-perbit overheads incurred, when SMART memory is encrypted with Memcryption and CME, is presented in Table 2 . 3 
Power side channel attacks
Asymmetric read/write characteristics in NVMs like STT-MRAM make them susceptible to side channel a acks, which exploit the di erent signatures involved with reading/writing '1's and '0's. STTMRAMs employ MTJs with a xed FM reference layer, whereas the free layer could be oriented parallel or anti-parallel to the reference layer. Depending on the relative orientation of these two layers (parallel/anti-parallel), the MTJ is in a low/high resistance state. e low (high) resistance state corresponds to logic '0' (logic '1'). Hence, the read/write currents drawn from the source are di erent while reading/writing a '0' or a '1'. An a acker could a ach a resistor in a voltage-divider con guration with the MTJ cell, monitor the voltage drops across the resistor, and perform DPA to recover the data being wri en to or read o the cell. Such an advanced a ack was showcased against an STT-MRAM-based cache in [45] .
For the SMART memory, writing is achieved with electric elds, not currents. Further, the electric eld magnitude required for writing '0's and '1's is equivalent (see write voltage and polarization voltage traces in Fig. 3 ). is is because there is no reference layer or tunneling magnetoresistance in ME-AFMRAM, which can cause asymmetricity. As for the read operation, the proximity e ectinduced moment in the Pt electrode is slightly di erent for reading '0' or '1'. However, this imbalance in the Hall signals can be compensated by introducing appropriate o sets in the Hall measurements as demonstrated in [22] . Hence, the SMART memory can achieve symmetric reads/writes for both '0→1' and '1→0' transitions, thus thwarting any possibility of DPA-based side channel a acks.
Photonic side channel and backside attacks
Leveraging photonic side channel (PSC) to circumvent the security guarantees provided by cryptographic algorithms like AES and RSA has been discussed very recently. Simple Photonic Emission Analysis (SPEA) or Di erential Photonic Emission Analysis (DPEA) can be carried out using equipment available for the same price as that of the power analysis equipment. In the case of PSC, photoemissions emanating from switching transistors (observed from IC's backside) in SRAM-or DRAM-based memories can be correlated with the data being programmed into the memory. In [33] , this unique side channel was found to originate when kinetic energy gained by charge carriers in the transistor channel is transferred to photons, which are visible through photo-detectors. In [34] , authors leveraged this information to perform side-channel analysis, ultimately recovering the full AES key. Modern-day chips use several metal layers, which interfere with the emission of photons from IC's frontside; therefore, a natural direction is to observe the photon emission from IC's backside. While CMOS-based memory technologies like SRAM and DRAM are prone to such backside PSC a acks, the SMART memory is AFM-based and involves no photonic emissions from transistor channels. Data read-out in SMART memory can only be accomplished through the AH measurement setup. Further, even if an advanced a acker is able to isolate the SMART memory cell and gain illicit access to the AH setup from the frontside, they would only recover the encrypted ciphertext (as described in Sec.4.3).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present SMART: a Secure Magnetoelectric Antiferromagnet-Based Tamper-Proof non-volatile memory, by utilizing the unique properties of ME-AFMs. e ME-AFMRAM, which is at the core of SMART memory, combines the bene ts of energy-e cient ME switching with the terahertz-range dynamics of AFMs, to implement an ∼aJ energy-per-bit NVM with ∼ps read/write latencies. Besides its superior performance as compared to prior NVMs like STT-MRAM and PCM, the SMART memory exhibits no sensitivity to external magnetic elds, which makes it resilient to magneticeld based data tampering and denial of memory service a acks that commonly plague other ferromagnet-based NVMs. To solve the security vulnerability of data persistence (a er power-down) in the SMART memory, we demonstrate a new encryption technique called Memcryption. Memcryption employs emerging ME-AFM logic devices to implement a CNOT-based in-memory encryption, which is particularly tailored to reduce decryption latencies in the SMART memory, given its ultra-fast access time. Further, symmetrical reads/writes of '0's and '1's renders side channel a acks like DPA futile against the SMART memory. Advanced photonic side channel a acks, which penetrate the memory chip from the backside are ine ective against the SMART memory due to the placement of the AH read-out setup, as well as the inherent Memcryption safeguard.
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